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Between Sorrow and Happy
Endings: A New Paradigm of
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Maureen A. Sweeneyt
Child, with a child pretending
Weary of lies you are sending home
So you sign all the papers in the family name
You're sad and you're sorry, but you're not ashamed.
Little green, have a happy ending.
Just a little green
Like the color when the spring is born
There'll be crocuses to bring to school tomorrow
Just a little green
Like the nights when the Northern lights perform
There'll be icicles and birthday clothes
And sometimes there'll be sorrow.'
-Joni Mitchell
PROLOGUE
My interest in the subject of adoption and in the position of the birth
mother who surrenders a child is a personal one: I am a birth mother. In
the interest of explaining my perspective on these questions, and also in the
belief that as a society we suffer from an enormous lack of insight into the
position of the birth mother, I will begin with the story of my own
experience of the adoption process. It was not a particularly bad experi-
t Maureen Sweeney is a staff attorney with Farmworkers Legal Services of North Carolina. She
has a B.A. from Wesleyan University and a J.D. from Yale Law School.
1. Little Green, from the album Blue (Sigoumb Music 1967).
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ence; in fact my impression is that it was more positive than is the average.
Nevertheless I will go into some detail because I believe it is important to
articulate and understand the complexities of a birth mother's motivations
and the pressures she may be facing. Only then will we be able to see
clearly how the law can best respond to the needs of all the parties to an
adoption proceeding.
I also believe that it is crucial for legal scholarship to take into account
the experience of the individuals interacting with the legal system. Law is
not a game of spinning out theories and arguments; it is arguably the
principal means for allocating and sanctioning power in our society. It
guides and constrains our actions, while greatly influencing the way that
we think about ourselves and our world. For this reason, responsible legal
scholarship must begin with some knowledge of the way in which the law
interacts with people, particularly in an area such as family law, which
involves some of the most personal, and the most formative, moments of
a person's life.
When I was nineteen years old and a sophomore in college, I got
pregnant and my world came crashing down around me. The future I had
always imagined suddenly looked very different, and my dreams for myself
seemed to have been snatched beyond my reach. Even my self-image, of
one who was in control of her life, was shattered.
I had been dating the baby's father for about six months when I got
pregnant. He was several years older than I and our relationship was one
in which, for the most part, he led and I followed. Shortly after we began
dating, he started pressuring me to have intercourse. I resisted, but not
very well and not for long. As with most things in that relationship, I soon
found myself seeing his side of things and losing my own frame of
reference.
When I first discovered that I was pregnant, I wanted to get married.
The baby's father preferred to deny that anything had happened; he
certainly did not want to get married. After several months, I realized that
he was not going to save me, and I began to look within myself for
strength. Somewhat to my surprise, I began to find it. Through the course
of my pregnancy, the terror I felt at my body's betrayal and my lack of
control over it gave way to a sense of excitement and wonder at the power
I possessed to nurture this new life. This sense of power in turn helped to
give me the strength to make some very difficult decisions.
When I was about four months pregnant, a friend suggested that I
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might want to place the baby with an agency for adoption. Until she
brought it up, the idea had never occurred to me. For the next five months
I struggled with the question of whether to keep my baby or to surrender
him or her for adoption.
I worked all through those months with a social worker from the
adoption agency who was genuinely concerned that I make the best
decision for myself, whether that meant keeping the baby or surrendering
him or her for adoption. By the time I was ready to give birth, I was fairly
confident of my decision to surrender the baby. I had thought long and
hard about the gift that I would give him (I had a boy), wanting to give
him something of myself. In the end I made a baby quilt for him and wrote
a short letter attempting to explain how much I loved him and why I was
giving him up. His father also prepared a gift for the baby.
In this time of waiting and preparation, I was asked what sort of a
family I wanted my child to have. Unconsciously, I asked the agency to
replicate my own: a close extended family, active in some religious
tradition, for whom education was important. I was assured that a family
would be chosen that came as close as possible to this description. And so
I waited to give birth, feeling ready to give my baby to this family I
constantly tried to imagine.
To my surprise, however, by the time my son was born I was more
than ready to keep him. The desire for me to take my son in my arms and
keep him with me was tremendously strong. I saw him and touched him
right after I'd given birth to him, but I didn't hold him then. For the first
twenty-four hours in the hospital I was afraid to go down to the nursery
and even look at him. I could feel him pulling me even from the other end
of the hall, demanding with his little cries that I change my mind and
continue to care for and nurture him as I had for the previous nine months.
Eventually I did go down and see him. I went into the nursery and looked
at him and touched his tiny hands. Then he started to cry and I reached out
to hold him and quiet him. But then I pulled back my hands and quickly
left the room, terrified that I would impulsively make a decision to keep
him, a decision I was afraid would lead him, his father, and me into years
of bitterness. My last morning in the hospital I did hold my son. I held
him with tears streaming down my face.
The baby's father and I spent the weekend I was released from the
hospital wrestling with the question of what we should do. We went back
and forth; there was a moment when I had my hand on the phone to call
a taxi to take us back to the hospital and pick up our son (who stayed there
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until Monday when someone from the adoption agency would take him to
a foster home). In the end we decided to go through with the adoption.
On Tuesday morning we gathered together the letter and gifts and went
down to the agency. We were ushered into a room where we talked for a
while with my social worker. She showed us pictures of the family they
had chosen for our son and told us a little about his future parents.
Then she brought out the relinquishment papers. THIS IS FINAL
AND IRREVOCABLE was emblazoned in big, bold letters three times on
the one-page form. I don't remember anything else about the papers I
signed, except for that ominous warning against later doubts. Illinois
adoption law required that the father of a newborn, if known and
identified, also relinquish his parental rights, and as we were about to sign
the papers the baby's father wanted to change his mind. But after the
struggle we had gone through, I was confident in the end that adoption
would be best for our son. I was not going to change my mind at that
point. Perhaps he realized that as the one who would have taken care of the
baby, I was the one whose life would have been most radically affected by
this decision. For whatever reason he went along with my insistence. Panic
gave way to relief that he chose not to exercise the power he had at that
moment to determine the direction of my life.
When I signed the papers relinquishing my parental rights to my son,
I framed my principal reasons for the decision in terms of his best
interests. Although I thought about financial issues, my main consideration
was whether or not I could provide a stable family for him. After time and
reflection, I believe that within that genuine desire for my son was also a
desire for myself. I knew that if I kept him I would probably marry his
father (who had in the weeks before the birth become the one pushing for
marriage), and my instincts were clamoring that this would be a disastrous
move for me. My sense of self had become lost in that relationship; in it,
I had little control over my own direction. At the time of my son's birth
I could not have articulated this understanding, but I believe now that I
knew it subconsciously, and that it was one source of my feeling that I
would not be able to provide the kind of family I wanted my son to have.
My son is now seven years old, and my love for him now is no less
than it was when he was born. There are times when the pain of his
absence is so intense that it is almost incapacitating. His birthday is always
particularly difficult. And yet I am convinced that adoption was the best,
most empowering option for him and for me, given the circumstances of
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my life. It allowed me to follow my conscience and to honor the sanctity
of human life by carrying through my pregnancy and giving birth, while
at the same time allowing me to avoid being forced by circumstances into
an oppressive situation. It gave my son a good chance at life in a stable,
loving home. It is from the joy and pain and freedom of being a birth
mother that I address the subject of adoption.
The surrender of babies for adoption has roots deep in our history.
Nevertheless, the actual surrendering experience has received relatively
little attention. Despite wide acceptance in our society of the practice of
adoption as seen from the point of view of the adoptive family, there
remains little acknowledgment of the birth mother's side of the process.
This reluctance to think and speak of birth mothers perhaps stems from the
stigma society has attached to the situation of most birthmothers-having
an unexpected and unplanned baby outside of marriage. There is also
discomfort with the idea that women give away their babies. However
much this part of the process is necessary to enable adoption, we find it
easier to simply avoid thinking too much about what we see as a voluntary
repudiation of motherhood. Perhaps it challenges too deeply our concept
of motherhood as something basically biological. Perhaps we recognize on
some level the deep pain that it involves, and simply find it easier not to
think about it. It is thus not entirely surprising that society has failed to
focus much attention on birth mothers.
What is at first glance more surprising is the silence of the women's
movement on the subject of adoption and on the concerns of birth mothers,
women who tend to be in very vulnerable positions and who pose
challenging questions on reproductive decisions, the nature of motherhood,
and the ideal of the family. Yet feminist literature has been silent.
I believe that this is largely due to the intensity of the feminist battle
for the legalization of abortion. Adoption has been proposed by opponents
of abortion as an alternative to abortion, and has thus been seen as itself
opposing abortion. I believe that the women's movement has too quickly
accepted this dichotomy and has too firmly embraced abortion as the
solution to unexpected pregnancies. Recognizing that the feminist position
on abortion developed in response to very severe opposition, it is not
surprising that this position is weighted heavily to one side, emphasizing
exclusively the inalienable right of the mother to control her reproduction.
Nevertheless, given the current deadlock in the societal dialogue on
abortion, I believe that it is time that we in the women's movement attempt
to articulate a more subtle and nuanced position on reproductive choice, a
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position that acknowledges the terrible price that is paid in abortion, even
where the choice to abort represents the lesser of evils in a woman's
particular circumstances.
Women's lives unfold within a context of the injustice and oppression
of sexism, a context that for many women also includes racism and
economic injustice. Within this context, childbearing and childrearing often
become opportunities for intensified oppression of women and, directly or
indirectly, of their children. For many women, the birth of a child ensures
the continuation of a cycle of poverty, because the responsibilities and
financial burdens of child care cut off opportunities for employment,
education and training. Women with children are often discriminated
against and not taken seriously as workers because they are mothers, and
many women stay in low-paying jobs because higher-paying jobs would not
allow the flexibility necessary to the primary caretaker of a child.
In addition, a child can be a very effective source of power for a man
over the child's mother. A child's father can use his rights to the child and
the mother's desire to protect the child to control the mother. This control
can be based on physical violence, on economic dependence, on the threat
of taking the child away from the mother, or on a sense of moral
obligation. In the same way, a woman's desire to provide for and protect
her child, given her limited opportunities to do so by herself, makes her
more vulnerable to becoming and staying economically or otherwise
dependent on any man. This dynamic of power is of course even further
accentuated when a pregnancy is the result of rape or incest, situations in
which the act of intercourse itself is a clear act of domination. The birth
of a child in such a situation can serve to solidify and extend that
domination over a lifetime.
It is this culture of injustice and oppression of women, especially of
poor women and women of color, that necessitates abortion in our world
today. There are times when abortion is necessary literally to save the
mother's life. In the same way, there are times when abortion is necessary
to save the mother from a life of abuse and despair. Furthermore, given
the imbeddedness of sexism and the failure of the dominant culture to
recognize and acknowledge it, we must have the power to control our
reproduction ourselves, and to recognize for ourselves the situations in
which the difficult choice to abort is a matter of such pressing need as to
override other considerations.
I would certainly not be the first to point out the difficulty with which
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most women decide to abort a pregnancy. Despite a woman's recognition
of other very important considerations and of her right to make her own
decisions, it is almost always difficult for her to decide to end a pregnancy
with abortion. This, I believe, is due to the recognition of the life potential
of the fetus and of her connection with it. To deny that life goes contrary
to the experience of anyone who has been pregnant and felt her child move
within her, or even of anyone who has seen someone go through pregnancy
and give birth.
We must not allow the anti-abortion movement to usurp our connec-
tion, our concern, our valuation of this life. If we oversimplify the abortion
issue on a theoretical level and talk only of a woman's rights, we objectify
and separate ourselves from a life to which we are in fact intimately
connected. We deny our own pain in making the decision to abort, and we
fall to our society's pressure to use things and people only in ways that
serve our own needs, and then to discard them. Women have known
historically, and continue to know, the degradation and the injustice of
being used as objects to satisfy the needs and whims of the more powerful.
We must not allow our own empowerment to simply move us into the
more powerful position. We must strive for a new model of human
interaction based on responsibility and respect for ourselves and for others.
As feminists, we should be willing and able to support the legal right
to an abortion and at the same time deplore the loss of human life involved
and work for the day when abortion will no longer be necessary. One way
of doing this is to develop alternatives to abortion that empower women.
These alternatives often will not be easy, and may in fact be very difficult
and painful. Fighting to affirm and value all human life (including both
women and children) will not be painless, but we must not compromise our
vision by succumbing to the urge of an oppressive, consumerist society to
acknowledge the value of only that life that we can accommodate without
inconveniencing ourselves. Our ethic must encompass care and responsibil-
ity for one another, as well as a demand for justice for the individual. We
must fight for a world where no life is disposable, and where a woman's
decision about reproduction is not narrowed down to a choice between a
decent life for herself and life for her fetus.
This paper looks at ways that we can develop adoption into an
empowering option for pregnant women who feel that they cannot raise the
child they are carrying. In it I seek to present a new vision of adoption-a
vision that arises from within an ethic of care for and responsibility to all
those whose lives are indelibly changed by the adoption experience.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It should come as no surprise that the issue of adoption reform evokes
great passion from many quarters. The members of the adoption triangle,
those individuals whose lives are touched by adoption, are affected very
deeply by their experience. An adoptee's self-identity is inextricably tied
up with the fact of adoption in her life. Adoption is also central in the
ongoing efforts of birth parents and adoptive parents alike to define and
give content to their differing roles as parents.
The debate is also fueled by the pain experienced by many adoption
participants as a result of the current scheme. Many adoptees are deeply
dissatisfied with the secrecy shrouding adoption in most states, and many
of the groups advocating change in adoption policies include adoptive
parents and birth parents among their members. As a birth mother, I am
deeply aware that the popular conception (and all too often the legal
formulation) of the interests and the experience of birth mothers is
fundamentally mistaken. This misperception leads to policies which, instead
of protecting the real interests of birth mothers, are often painful and
destructive for us. As members of the adoption triangle begin to speak out
frankly about their experiences, it becomes clear that most current adoption
policies fail to address their needs and interests. With so many of the par-
ticipants in traditional2 agency adoptions voicing dissatisfaction at the
inadequacies and the injustice they have experienced within the adoption
process, there can no longer be any excuse for refusing to reevaluate the
system.
Many states have instituted some measure of reform, but state
legislatures continue to debate heatedly what interests are at stake and what
specific shape reform should take. Moreover, the lack of understanding
among agencies and among both legislative and judicial decision-makers
strictly limits the scope and effectiveness of many statutory reforms.
Although the door has been opened in recent years to an adoption debate,
misunderstanding still permeates the discussion.
Much of the debate over the goals of adoption reform and the
2. By "traditional" I refer to the conception of adoption that became prominent in the early part
of the twentieth century. The characteristics of this image will be described in this paper. For an
interesting historical survey of adoption practices in the United States since Massachusetts enacted the
first state adoption statute in 1851, see Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958-1983, 17
FAM. L.Q. 173 (1983).
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appropriateness of various judicial and legislative actions stems, I believe,
from differing understandings, different paradigms of the social and legal
experience of adoption: the traditional paradigm, embodied in the law and
in traditional attitudes about adoption; and a new paradigm, emerging from
the experience, reflection, and activism of members of the adoption
triangle.
I will begin this discussion of adoption by highlighting the importance
of the conceptualization of social phenomena in a discussion of the impact
of a social-legal paradigm on thought and action in a particular field. Using
the model first outlined by Thomas Kuhn in his study of revolutions in
scientific thought,3 I will argue that we are currently confronted with the
need for a paradigm shift in the field of adoption. That is, we need a new
way of looking at and thinking about adoption. I will discuss the tradition-
al, legal paradigm of infant agency adoption,4 and the ways that this
portrayal of roles and interests has been challenged by adoptees, birth
mothers, adoptive parents, and others. I will demonstrate how it fails to
account for the experience of many adoption participants, and how it is
unhelpful, and even harmful, as a paradigm for policy making. I will then
propose a new paradigm for adoption. Finally, since new paradigms bring
with them new questions, I will address several examples of the questions
that arise from an adoption paradigm shift, suggesting ways in which
statutory and agency reforms can move towards an understanding and a
practice of adoption that is just and humane.
II. LAW, SOCIETY AND PARADIGM
Much of the thinking about adoption reform is grounded in one of two
misconceptions about the relationship between the law and societal norms.
Reformers begin either with the proposition that the law should change
only to reflect clear and unequivocal changes in social norms, or with the
converse proposition that it is the place of the law to mandate behavior that
will in turn cause changes in social norms. Both of these stances character-
ize the relationship as the interaction of two separate forces, one of which
3. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
4. There are many different circumstances in which adoptions occur, including the adoption of
older children, adoption by relatives or people known to the child(ren) or birth parents, stepparent
adoption, and private adoption of newborns. Much of the substance of this paper could be applied to
any adoption situation. Nonetheless, this analysis addresses only adoptions by strangers of newborn
infants, through an adoption agency accredited by the state.
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will control the other. This oversimplification fails to reflect social reality,
and is of little help in trying to understand the way law operates as a force
in modern society.
Many scholars reject this polarization of law and society. Robert
Gordon, for example, asserts that the legal world is "fundamentally
constitutive" of social life.5 He acknowledges the subtlety of the influence
of legal rules on social norms and thinking, and recognizes the ultimate
power this subtlety permits:
The power exerted by a legal regime consists less in the force that
it can bring to bear against violators of its rules than in its capacity
to persuade people that the world described in its images and
categories is the only attainable world in which a sane person
would want to live.6
The images and categories created by a legal scheme will strongly
influence, or even dictate, the frame of reference for thinking about social
life. Even reformers, who may see the problems of the old paradigm and
the need for change, are very often unable to break away from the
formulation given the issue in prevalent policies.7
Martha Minow takes Gordon's analysis a step further and advances the
view that "not only is law constitutive of social relations, but social
relations are constitutive of law." 8 She proposes a way of understanding
and of studying the relationship between legal and social life by focusing
on the social roles of individuals. These roles are "[llegally defined and
reinforced, . . . [but] also have sources in custom, religion, and in the
5. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 104 (1984), cited in Minow, "Forming
Underneath Everything that Grows": Towards a History of Family Law, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 819, 823
n.10.
6. Gordon, supra note 5, at 109. Thomas Kuhn, in THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS,
supra note 3, emphasizes how experiments have demonstrated that people will visually perceive only
those images that they have been trained to expect. He proposes that "something like a paradigm is
prerequisite to perception itself. What a man [sic] sees depends both upon what he looks at and also
upon what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see". Id. at 113. How much
more must this insight be true for the subjective perception of socio-legal (and often moral) norms.
7. Much of the writing about adoption suffers from this inability to escape the traditional paradigm.
As a clear example, see Fergus Colim 0 Donnell's otherwise very thoughtful treatment of the sealed
records controversy, The Four-Sided Triangle: A Comparative Study of the Confidentiality ofAdoption
Records, 21 U.W. ONT. L. REV. 129 (1983).
8. Minow, supra note 5, at 823 n.10.
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invention of individual personality."9 They are complicated and ever
changing, as individuals define their social roles partly in reference to
established understandings and partly out of their own creativity. These
roles provide a context within which both continuity and change can be
achieved. Minow explores the ways in which women have used their
understandings of their own social roles as mothers, wives, widows, and
daughters, to justify activities in traditionally male spheres.1"
These analyses point to the extremely complex and symbiotic
relationship between legal rules and social life. Minow notes that an
understanding of this relationship is especially vital in a field like family
law which consists more of pseudo-normative pronouncements about "The
Family" than it consists of sanctions for the violation of rules.' The
interdependence of social and legal constructions in such an area is often
very nearly complete.
The fundamental symbiosis of legal and social structures is quite
evident in the field of adoption. We will see how legislators and judges
"identify" the needs of adoption participants by analyzing the social
construction of the roles of adopted children, adoptive parents, birth
parents, and, recently, adult adoptees. In the same way, the social
understandings of these roles, held both by the people who live them out
and by others, are in part constituted by the images that are sanctioned in
the legal paradigm of adoption. The behavior and the self-perception of
participants in adoptions are molded to a large extent by the images
projected by the law of their roles in the adoption triangle. It is for this
reason, no less than for pragmatic reasons of adoption logistics, that reform
of adoption laws is essential to the efforts of adoption reform advocates.
In the last twenty years, adult adoptees have begun to challenge the
beneficence of the adoption system; in their adoptee role, using the
language of the system itself, they have demanded change on the grounds
that current policies are not in their "best interests." In response, some
decision-makers are beginning to expand their consideration of adoptees to
include the interests and concerns of adult adoptees. The resulting (and
ongoing) debate over adoption policies evidences the beginnings of a
critical examination of traditional practices in the adoption field.
Change, however, has been slow in coming, and in many places has
9. Id. at 824.
10. Id. at 838.
11. Id. at 837.
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not yet come at all. I believe that this is largely due to the deep silence
surrounding birth mothers. On the one hand, commonly held assumptions
about birth mothers' desire for privacy and anonymity have dissuaded
legislators and researchers from contacting birth mothers for their views.
They have assumed that any child surrendered in adoption must have been
"illegitimate"; that any mother who gave up an "illegitimate" child to
adoption is primarily interested in privacy; 12 and that she wants to be left
alone to go on with her life, with no reminders of a past mistake she is
trying to forget.
13
On the other hand, birth mothers have not used their position to speak
out about adoption reform in the way that adoptees have. This failure to
speak out may be largely attributed to the double-edged stigma attached to
being a birth mother, which marks us as women who both conceived a
child outside of marriage and "gave away" that child. The birth mother
status opens a woman up to a number of complex and ambivalent societal
reactions to sex and mothering. The popular mythology tells her that she
was wrong to get pregnant, that as a single woman she was not meant to
be a mother, and at the same time that she failed as a mother (and as a
woman) when she "gave away" her child. Court cases and statutes alike
tell her that the reason she surrendered her child is that she was ashamed
of having an "illegitimate" child, and that her overriding interest from that
moment on has been to separate herself from that experience and to avoid
its public discovery.
Birth mothers also may suffer from an intensified sense of the
powerlessness felt by many women in and around childbirth. Emily Martin
uses a Marxist analysis to compare the language and the accepted practices
of childbirth with those of industrial production in our society, 4 and her
work highlights the powerlessness over and alienation from the birthing
12. Howe, supra note 2, at 190-91.
13. See, e.g., 0 Donnell, supra note 7, at 146 ("The main interest of the birth parents is their
desire to maintain their privacy and to be able to rebuild their lives after giving a child up for
adoption."). However, several recent student-written notes have suggested the possibility that birth
mothers may have some interest in continued or renewed contact with their children. See, e.g., Note,
The Best of Both "Open" and "Closed" Adoption Worlds: A Call for the Reform of State Statutes, 13
J. LEGIS. 292, 300-01 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Best of Both]; Note, Adoption: Sealed Adoption Record
Laws-Constitutional Violation or a Need for Judicial Reform?, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 575, 580 (1982)
[hereinafter Note, Violation or Need for Reform ?]; Comment, Severed Roots: The Sealed Adoption
Records Controversy, 6 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 103, 112 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, Severed Roots].




process felt by many women in an atmosphere where the woman's uterus
is treated as a machine, the woman herself as a laborer, the obstetrician as
a manager, the hospital as a factory, and the baby as the product.1 5
Although Martin does not direct her analysis specifically to the
experience of birth mothers, this analogy is clearly applicable and provides
a very powerful metaphor for that experience. Birth mothers are often seen
as producing a baby and then giving it away. The adoption triangle even
provides ready "consumers," the adoptive parents, for the birth mother's
product. As in production, it has been in many instances these "consum-
ers," the adoptive parents, who have most strongly influenced decisions
affecting the policies and practices of the adoption system, 6 with far less
attention given to the needs of the "laborer," the birth mother. The very
prevalent language of the "baby market" in discussions of adoption 7
illustrates the power and the aptness of the production metaphor to the
current adoption process.' 8
Martin warns of the dangers of a strong focus on the medical
technology of reproduction, admonishing that we must not allow our
technological capabilities to "divert[] our attention from the social
relationships of power and domination that are involved whenever humans
use machines to produce goods in our society."' 9 This warning is
particularly poignant when applied to the experience of birth mothers, who
are encouraged to alienate themselves, to become detached emotionally
from the children to whom they give birth, and who are often thought of
primarily as baby-makers.
Birth mothers internalize many of these images and judgments and
accept to some degree the deficient and destructive self-image given to
them by society and by the law. This socially and legally constructed role
of birth mother, combined with the intensity of a birth mother's grief,
makes it very difficult for a birth mother to speak out publicly.
Nevertheless, birth mothers and fathers are slowly beginning to emerge
into the public debate. They are forming groups organized and devoted
15. Id. at 57, 146.
16. Note, Best of Both, supra note 13, at 292-93.
17. See, e.g., Ackerman, Aggressive agencies seek part of "hot" market, Boston Globe, Mar. 21,
1988, at 1, col. 1; Ackerman, Long waits, high costs in "baby market, " Boston Globe, Mar. 20, 1988,
at 1, col. 1.
18. See Note, Best of Both, supra note 13, at 292 n.2, referring to Lynne McTaggart's analogy of
the adoption process to production in THE BABY BROKERS: THE MARKETING OF WHITE BABIES IN
AMERICA 339 (1980).
19. E. MARTIN, supra note 14, at 57.
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specifically to support and advocacy for birth parents.' In addition,
general adoption advocacy groups have begun in recent years to focus
more attention on birth mothers and birth fathers in their analyses of
adoption policies. The movement for open adoptions, where the parties are
known to each other, also necessarily focuses attention on birth mothers in
an unprecedented way. Finally, a few researchers have begun to investigate
the experiences of birth mothers.
The slowly emerging voice of birth mothers deeply and painfully
challenges prevalent thinking about adoption. However, the current social
and legal role of birth mother, the traditional formulation of birth mothers'
needs and interests in the adoption process, cannot allow for the depth of
change that is required to meet this challenge. To respond to the depth and
breadth of this challenge, we need nothing less than a revolution in our
social and legal thinking about birth mothers and, more broadly, about
adoption.
An apt analogy to the situation may be Thomas Kuhn's explanation of
the conditions that bring about a revolution in scientific thought, a
phenomenon he calls a paradigm shift. Kuhn describes the process that
leads to such a revolution:
Sometimes a normal problem, one that ought to be solvable by
known rules and procedures, resists the reiterated onslaught of the
ablest members of the group within whose competence it falls. On
other occasions a piece of equipment designed and constructed for
the purpose of normal research fails to perform in the anticipated
manner, revealing an anomaly that cannot, despite repeated effort,
be aligned with professional expectation. In these and other ways
besides, normal science repeatedly goes astray. And when it
does-when, that is, the profession can no longer evade anomalies
that subvert the existing tradition of scientific practice-then begin
the extraordinary investigations that lead the profession at last to
a new set of commitments, a new basis for the practice of science.2
20. The largest such organization is Concerned United Birthparents, which was founded in 1976
and is a nationwide network of birth parents and others concerned with birth parents' experiences in
adoption. For information, contact Concerned United Birthparents, 2000 Walker Street, Des Moines,
IA 50317, (319) 359-4068.
21. T. KUHN, supra note 3, at 5-6.
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In short, the limits of the old paradigm are undeniably exposed in the fact
that the anomalies, the phenomena that are unexplainable under the old
paradigm, outnumber the phenomena accounted for by it. The profession
then pushes its research beyond the limits of normal science within the
bounds of the old paradigm to search creatively for a new paradigm, an
entirely new way of looking at the questions of science.
Although a new paradigm explains many of the old anomalies, it will
at the same time raise new questions, questions that were impossible to ask
in the old framework. These questions will then be analyzed from within
the intellectual framework of the new paradigm.
Kuhn's analysis of the process and the structure of a paradigm shift has
been applied to many fields other than science. Let us now examine the
traditional adoption paradigm and analyze the need for change there.
III. THE ADOPTION PARADIGM
A. Process, Parties and "Protections ": The Traditional Paradigm
Great secrecy and rigidity characterize the legal structure of adoption
as embodied in traditional state statutes. 3 The birth mother signs a
document in which she irrevocably and indefinitely severs her rights and
responsibilities to the child. The adoption agency takes custody of the child
and proceeds to place her with adoptive parents. When the adoption
becomes final in court, usually after a probationary period of six months
to a year, ' the court seals the original birth certificate and adoption
records and enters into the public record a new birth certificate, which
contains the names of the adoptive parents.
Thereafter the sealed records may be opened only by court order,
which in the majority of jurisdictions requires the petitioner to show "good
cause."2 5 Interpretations of the requirements for establishing good cause
22. Kuhn himself acknowledges the parallels between his scientific revolutions and political ones.
He points out that "the sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis is prerequisite to revolution" in both
spheres. Id. at 92.
23. Examples of traditional statutes are the adoption provisions in Georgia's law, GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-8 (1982), and New York's Domestic Relations Law, N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW, §§ 109-117 (Consol.
1979 & Supp. 1989).
24. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 913 (Supp. 1988) (requiring one year residency); N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAW § 112.6 (Consol. 1979) (six month residency with adoptive family required).
25. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-18 (1982) (court order required); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW
§ 114 (Consol. 1979 & Supp. 1989).
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vary from state to state. In some states cause is shown with a demonstra-
tion of medical necessity. In others it has been sufficient to demonstrate a
profound psychological need,' or, more loosely, the need to find a
personal identity.27 Some states dismiss an adoptee's expressed need to
know about her background as "mere curiosity," and therefore as
insufficient to establish good cause.' Most of the case law about adoption
issues involves an adoptee's right of access to information about her birth
family and the proper standard for judging good cause.
This case law states explicitly many of the assumptions about the
members of the adoption triangle that are implicit in the traditional
statutory schemes. The cases paint a fairly detailed portrait of the parties
as they are perceived by judges, who then proceed to base their decisions
on the interests they presume these parties to have. As a synthesis of legal
standards and presumed interests, the case law reflects the paradigm of
adoption and the traditional perceptions of adoption that at once support
and are supported by the legal structure.
According to this paradigm, the birth parents are very young, and are
unmarried (the baby, therefore, being "illegitimate")? 9 The birth father
is either not mentioned by the court or is assumed to be at least as unable
or as unwilling as is the birth mother to provide for the child.' The
teenage birth mother recognizes the limitations of her ability to raise this
child, and the restrictions a child-particularly an illegitimate child-will
place on her future. Longing to avoid the ignominy of having given birth
to an "illegitimate" child, she signs away her rights, gives up her baby,
and gets on with her life, free from the constant reminder and punishment
of her indiscretion of having become pregnant outside of marriage. Sealed
26. See, e.g., In re Hayden, 106 Misc. 2d 849, 435 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (allegations of
psychological harm and reasonable fear of being DES baby establish primafacie case that good cause
exists); In re Anonymous, 92 Misc. 2d 224, 399 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (severe psychological
disorder resulting from adoptee's lack of knowledge about his identity established good cause).
27. See, e.g., Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't. of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 319, 372 A.2d
646, 655 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (adult adoptee's need to know about heritage is more than "mere
curiosity" and constitutes a showing of good cause).
28. See e.g., Backes v. Catholic Family & Community Servs., 210 N.J. Super. 186, 205-06, 509
A.2d 283, 292-93 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985); In re Linda F. M., 52 N.Y.2d 236, 240 (1978); In re
Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1388-89 (R.I. 1986); Bradey v. Children's Bureau, 275 S.C. 622, 628-29,
274 S.E.2d 418, 422 (1981).
29. Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 307, 372 A.2d at 649.
30. Id. Statutes requiring the unmarried birth father's participation in the surrendering of parental
rights are fairly recent, and most litigation has been under the old statutes.
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records guarantee the privacy of her secret.31 In the language of a 1955
case:
[I]f [a birth mother] wishes to permit suitable, desirous and
qualified persons to adopt the infant, her indiscretion will not be
divulged. [The guarantee of sealed records] further assures her that
the interests of the child will be protected in that no one will ever
know by means of the adoption proceeding that the child is
illegitimate.3"
The understanding is that the termination of the legal relationship
between the birth mother and her child effectuates the end of any
relationship between them. As one commentator explains it, "When the
adoption is final, all relations between the biological parents and the child
are severed forever."33 Once these relations are severed, the birth mother
is free to start a new life, in which she may or may not reveal the
existence of her erstwhile child. 4 If the existence of this child is later
disclosed to her family and friends, her new life may be destroyed.
Secrecy in adoption enables her to be free of the "apprehension that the
past may come back to plague [her]."
In a recent New York case, a guardian ad litem was appointed to
represent the interests of the birth parents in proceedings regarding an
adoptee's petition for access to her records. The court then ordered,
contrary to the recommendation of the guardian, that the guardian must
necessarily oppose any petition to open the record, stating that "the
continued anonymity of the natural parents is the underpinning of the
statute and must be presumed to be the desire of the natural parents."37
The court in In re Assalone4 was presented with a request of an adoptee
31. Id.
32. People v. Doe, 138 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 (Erie County Ct. 1955).
33. Note, Violation or Need for Reform?, supra note 13, at 575.
34. Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 307, 320, 372 A.2d at 649, 655 (testimony of an adult adoptee whose
birth mother had chosen not to tell her husband or her children from that marriage that she had
surrendered a child for adoption).
35. See, e.g., In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1978); Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 320, 372
A.2d at 655-56 (testimony of Deputy Commissioner of Health regarding an adoptee who appeared on
the doorstep of her birth mother who had never told her husband about the adoptee, and the resulting
separation of the birth mother and her husband).
36. In re Hayden, 106 Misc. 2d 849, 850, 435 N.Y.S.2d 541, 542 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
37. Hayden, 106 Misc. 2d at 851-52, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
38. 512 A.2d 1383 (R.I. 1986).
1990]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
to open adoption records. It employed a four-part balancing test to weigh
the interests of the parties. The only factor referring to the birth mother
asserted that her interest was in avoiding being identified.39 In short,
within the traditional paradigm, the birth mother ends her relationship with
her child when she signs the relinquishment papers, and from then on her
interest is, in the words of Justice Brandeis, "to be let alone."'
The secrecy of traditional adoption schemes also protects the integrity
of the adoptive family from intrusion by a birth mother who may regret
her decision to relinquish her child.4 The sealing of the adoption records
and the issuance of the new birth certificate guarantee that the new
adoptive family will look, as much as possible, like a family in which
children and parents are biologically related. The adoptive parents' child
is truly "theirs." There is no danger that the child's past life will intrude
on her new one and disrupt the life of the adoptive family.
The adoptee's placement with the adoptive family and the sealing of
the records free her forever from the stigma of illegitimacy that might
attach to her if her origins should become known.42 She instead derives
her identity from the parents named on her birth certificate, just as if she
had actually been born to them. The birth certificate creates and maintains
a fiction that the adoptive family is the only family she has ever had. The
adopted child is thus made part of a "legitimate" family, i.e. a two-parent
family, that can provide well for her and is free from the threat of
intrusion.
39. Id. at 1386.
40. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), cited in Mills
148 N.J. Super. at 312, 372 A.2d at 651. Courts are beginning to refer to the possibility that some
birth mothers may wish to renew contact with their adult children. In In re Christine, 121 R.I. 203,
397 A.2d 511 (1979), a petition by a birth mother for information about her eleven-year-old child, the
court acknowledged the "tremendous compelling desire of any parent to know the whereabouts of his
or her child," but nonetheless held that the adoption system is predicated on a guarantee of secrecy for
all parties and that something more would have to be shown before the information would be released.
121 R.I. at 205, 397 A.2d at 514. See also In re Assalone, 512 A.2d at 1389-90 (court acknowledges
that birth parents may want to renew contact, but concludes that statutory scheme guarantees their
privacy and that absent legislative change, good cause must be shown before they will be contacted).
These cases highlight the need for legislative reform in the adoption area, where judges feel constrained
in proceeding counter to their understanding of the express and inferred intent of legislatures that
passed traditional adoption statutes.
41. Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 307, 372 A.2d at 649.
42. See, e.g., Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 308, 372 A.2d at 649; People v. Doe, 138 N.Y.S.2d 307,
309 (Erie County Ct. 1955); In re Christine, 121 R.I. at 206, 397 A.2d at 513; Bradey v. Children's
Bureau, 275 S.C. 622, 628, 274 S.E.2d 418, 422 (1981).
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B. Anomalies: Challenges to the Traditional Paradigm
There is growing evidence that the traditional paradigm of the adoption
triangle does not accurately portray the interests of the parties to adoption,
and that laws reflecting that paradigm do not adequately protect the genuine
interests of members of the adoption triangle. In the language of Kuhn,
there is mounting evidence of anomalies, of instances where the traditional
adoption paradigm would predict no problems in adjustment in the adoptive
family situation, but the participants in the adoption are nonetheless
speaking out about great pain and insecurity in their experience of
adoption.
1. Adoptees
Because the ultimate objective in adoption has always been, at least
explicitly, the best interests of the adopted child, it was perhaps necessary
that the first serious challenge to adoption policies come from adoptees
themselves. Since 1970 the adult adoptees' movement has challenged the
judgments made on their behalf by legislators and judges.43 Adoption
advocacy groups have demonstrated the dilemma of the adult adoptee who
is still treated as an adopted child, emphasizing that as adopted children
grow up, their needs and abilities change." While it is true that children
may not know or be able to express what is in their best interests, the
longstanding practice of adoption in this country has provided us with large
numbers of former adopted children who are now mature, self-reflective
adult adoptees. Surely these adult adoptees are in a better position than
legislative and judicial decision-makers to identify the interests of adoptees,
both as children and adults.
Adoptees claim, firstly, that there is little point to maintaining the
fiction that adoptive families are identical to biological families. The
experience of growing up in an adoptive family, while most often one that
is very positive and full of love, is nonetheless different from the
experience of someone growing up in her biological family; an adoptee's
sense of identity is accordingly also different. Adoptees have repeatedly
maintained that denial of the difference is futile and serves only to stifle
43. Howe, supra note 1, at 190.
44. Note, Sealed Records in Adoptions: The Need for Legislative Reform, 21 CATH. LAw. 211,217
n.38 (1975).
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and frustrate a very natural desire to learn about one's physical, ethnic, and
personal history.
There are many reasons that an adoptee may experience a need to
know more about her biological family as she approaches adulthood. These
may include medical needs, a religious identity crisis, fear of genetic
diseases, search for a sense of identity, or a need to get beyond a block in
emotional development.45 Adoptees assert that they have the right to know
their heritage, for these or many other reasons. Adoptee groups are
unanimous in calling for the exchange of extensive background informa-
tion, including complete medical histories, physical descriptions and social
histories. Many also affirm the importance of access to a birth mother's
own explanation of the reasons she surrendered the adoptee. Likewise,
identifying information can be vital to an adult adoptee who experiences an
intense desire or need to meet her birth mother or other members of her
birth family.
There are now dozens of adoptee advocacy groups across the
country.' Virtually all of them are working on a national or a local level
for a legislative and judicial opening up of the adoption process. They are
working for the relaxation or elimination of restrictions on information,
both identifying and non-identifying, available to adoptees about their birth
families, and for the demystification of the adoption process in general.
2. Birth mothers
The voices of birth mothers are beginning to make themselves heard
in the debate over adoption law reform. Advocacy groups are becoming
more interested, or at least more vocal in their interest in birth mothers.
Researchers are also beginning to gather information about the experience
of birth mothers. 7
The growing data concerning the experiences of birth mothers
45. 0 Donnell, supra note 7, at 140, 143.
46. These groups include Origins, Alma Society (Adoptees' Liberty Movement Association),
Operation Identity, Organized Adoption Search Information Services, Reunite, Inc., Right to Know,
and the International Soundex Reunion Registry. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS, 1101-05 (24th
ed. 1990).
47. THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE by Arthur D. Sorosky, Annette Baran and Reuben Pannor, originally
published in 1978 and reissued in 1984, is the first exhaustive analysis of the controversy over the
sealing of adoption records that includes factual evidence regarding the experience and the interests of
birth mothers. Australian Robin Winkler has also conducted research focused on birth mothers. Cited
in CONCERNED UNITED BIRTHPARENTS, THE BIRTHPARENTS' PERSPECTIVE ON ADOPTION 5-6 (1987).
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fundamentally challenges the wisdom of the traditional adoption paradigm.
In fact, the voices of birth mothers who have joined in the public debate
over adoption have been virtually unanimous in identifying the misper-
ceptions concerning and the abuses of birth mothers in traditional
adoptions." Their experiences directly challenge two of the underlying
bases of the traditional paradigm: the emphasis placed on the shame of
illegitimacy as motivation for the birth mother's decision, and the serious
misperception and trivialization of the impact on the birth mother of
"giving away" her child.
a. Illegitimacy as Motivation in a Birth Mother's Decision
Traditionally, the concept of illegitimacy has dominated the adoption
debate in a way that is largely out of proportion to its actual, or proper,
importance. Legal rules assume that the best interests of the child require
completely burying any indication that she is "illegitimate," and that a
birth mother who surrenders her child is principally motivated by the
shame and fear of public exposure as the mother of an "illegitimate" child.
In In Re Adoption of Female Infant,49 for example, the judge explains the
District of Columbia statute sealing adoption records as being designed
primarily to protect the adoptee from the stigma of illegitimacy, and
secondarily to protect the adoptive parents from this stigma and to insure
the privacy of the birth parents (presumably to protect them from public
knowledge of the birth of an "illegitimate" child). This single-minded
analysis predictably leads to the conclusion that all the parties are primarily
interested in privacy after the adoption.'
As we have seen, adoptees have for some time been challenging this
assessment of their interests. Now as birth mothers begin to speak out, on
their own and in response to researchers' questions, their testimony reveals
that the birth mother's decision is far more complex than this analysis
implies and is in fact very often based on considerations other than
illegitimacy. The reasons for choosing adoption include any number of
48. While there is some danger in presuming to speak for the thousands of birth mothers who have
remained silent in the adoption debate, the overwhelming unanimity of experience among those birth
mothers who have spoken up suggests that those birth mothers who have been silent, for whatever
reason, would raise similar grievances with the adoption process.
49. 107 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 337 (1979); see also Greismann, The Adoptee's Right To Know:
In re Adoption of a Female Infant, 1 ANTIOCH L. 107, 108 (1981).
50. See articles cited supra notes 12-13.
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reasons why a woman might feel incapable of raising a child: economic
hardship, the birth mother's self-acknowledged lack of maturity, family
pressure, lack of an adequate emotional support system, the prospect of
being trapped by a baby in the cycle of poverty, or fear of becoming more
deeply entangled in a destructive relationship with the baby's father. The
reasons are as varied as the lives of the women making the decision. The
fear of losing a good reputation is only one factor, often a very minor one,
in the birth mother's difficult decision.
It is also important to remember that the severe stigma that has been
attached to motherhood outside of marriage is far from universally
applicable in today's society. Large and increasing numbers of women,
including many prominent and well-educated women, are having children
without being married and are making no attempt to hide the fact. While
the stigmatizing power of illegitimacy continues in mainstream American
society, that power is undoubtedly weakening. In light of this fact, and
especially in light of the testimony of birth mothers regarding the relative
unimportance of illegitimacy in their decisions, the central place of this
consideration in our adoption law must be reconsidered.
b. A Birth Mother's Grief
The other glaring discrepancy between public images of the adoption
triangle and the reality is the lack of recognition of the loss and grief
experienced by a birth mother upon surrendering her child. This grief is
the theme most often and most eloquently expressed by birth mothers in
speaking about adoption. The loss of a child through adoption has been
likened to losing a child to death; and many birth mothers see this loss as
the most traumatic experience of their lives, even years after the adop-
tion." The grief of adoption may in some cases be deeper than the grief
of death because the birth mother knows that it is less final. Knowing that
the child is still alive, the birth mother may wonder where she is, what she
is like, whether she is happy and healthy, or whether she will ever try to
contact her birth mother.52 A birth mother must also struggle with the
knowledge that she signed the papers that irrevocably separated her from
51. BIRTHPARENTS' PERSPECTIVE, supra note 45, at 5-6.
52. A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 52 (1984).
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her child and that her pain is in some sense self-inflicted.53
Birth mothers are also anxious to disabuse society (especially
lawmakers) of the notion that birth mothers forget about their children and
start new lives in which they do not wish to be disturbed with past sins. In
fact, the greatest concern of many birth mothers is that their children will
never forgive them for having abandoned them.' We certainly do not
forget about the children to whom we have given birth. Different people
react differently in times of grief. Some work through their grief by talking
about the person they have lost; some work through it by painting, singing,
or writing poetry, whether privately or in public; some have to separate
themselves from or deny their loss in an effort to go on with their lives.
No one forgets the loss of a loved one. Birth mothers are no different in
this respect from anyone else. Some will want to talk about their grief;
others will want to separate themselves from it. We each mourn our loss
in our own way, and we do go on with our lives. But we do not start
"new" lives; our loss will always be a part of us.55
The same research that has revealed the depth of a birth mother's pain
has shown that this pain does not go away. For many the pain only
intensifies over the years. 6 Birth mothers testify eloquently to loss
remembered over many years.57 An "overwhelming majority" of the birth
mothers interviewed in one study wanted to know what kind of people their
children turned out to be. 5 Eighty-two percent of those interviewed said
they would be amenable to a reunion if the adoptee, having reached
adulthood, desired it.59
Assumptions that birth mothers wish only to forget their children, that
they do forget them, and that they necessarily wish to separate themselves
forever from them are profoundly mistaken. These assumptions, held by
many people and incorporated into legislative and judicial practice, cause
much pain and frustration for birth mothers, who consequently find very
little understanding or help in dealing with the after effects of adoption.
These same assumptions often contribute to uncertainty among adoptees,
53. See, e.g., id. at 56 ("As far as demanding [my daughter] back, I forfeited that right the
morning I signed those papers."); id. at 66 ("My regrets and miseries are my own, and I have no right
to interfere with my child's life. I gave him up forever ... .
54. Id. at 49.
55. See CONCERNED UNITED BIRTHPARENTS, UNDERSTANDING BIRTHPARENTS.
56. CONCERNED UNITED BIRTHPARENTS, supra note 47, at 5-6.
57. A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, supra note 52, at 55-72.
58. Id. at 53.
59. Id. at 52-53.
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and encourage the fears that they were given away by their mothers
because the latter simply did not love them enough to keep them. In this
way, these invidious misconceptions are damaging both to birth mothers
and to adoptees.
3. Adoptive families
It has been argued, persuasively I think, that traditional adoption
schemes developed largely in response to the expressed needs and fears of
adoptive parents.' ° The strict secrecy surrounding adoption proceedings
protects the adoptive parents from any threat of intervention by a child's
birth family. The issuance of an amended birth certificate when the
adoption is final ensures that the adopted child will truly belong to the
adoptive parents, and that their family will be just like a biologically
related family. We have seen how this system promotes insecurity and pain
in many adoptees and birth mothers. The same may be said for many
adoptive parents.
Traditionally, many adoptive parents have felt anxious to deny any
difference between adoptive and biological families and to maintain the
strictest control over any access to information about the adoption. The
lack of a widespread movement for change among adoptive parents, given
the growing movements among the other members of the adoption triangle,
could lead to the conclusion that the secrecy and the fiction created by the
amended birth certificate at least serve a genuine interest of security among
adoptive parents. Research and experience nonetheless reveal widespread
insecurity among adoptive parents that is unexplained within the traditional
adoption paradigm. Attempts to insure the integrity of the adoptive family
by insisting that the adoptive family is just like a biological family, and
attempts to hide any contrary evidence, have by and large failed.
Almost all adoptees eventually discover that they are adopted, either
from their parents or from some other party. Interestingly, many of the
adoptees who find out only in later years that they were adopted said that
they had strongly suspected it for quite a while.61 People who know that
60. See Note, Best of Both, supra note 13, at 292-93. The argument is particularly persuasive in
the context of independent, non-agency adoption. See Howe, supra note 2, at 179-81.
61. A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, supra note 52, at 89 ("[When I discovered by accident
that I was adopted I] at last understood some of my own unhappiness and feelings of not belonging.");
id. at 90 ("I had always felt that I didn't belong, and knowing of the adoption justified these feelings";
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they are adopted are well aware of the difference between themselves and
those who know their birth parents. The biological connection between the
adoptee and her birth parents cannot be broken by the reissuance of a birth
certificate. Even if an adoptee never meets her birth parents, they are a
part of who she is (as she is a part of who they are). They are a part of her
history and her identity. Adoptees know this. Their difference from
biologically related daughters and sons is the source of the struggle that
many adoptees face in finding an identity, a sense of self.62
Michael Bohman found that adoptive parents immediately reacted to a
question about the difference between adoptive and non-adoptive families
by insisting that there was "no difference" between themselves and
"ordinary" parents. Howcver, contrary feelings were subsequently
expressed subconsciously throughout the interviews, leading Bohman to
conclude that the initial reaction sprang, not from confidence about their
response to the question, but from "general uncertainty about the role of
parent." 63 Despite conscious insistence (and perhaps belief) that there is
no difference, adoptive parents recognize on some level that their family
is not like all others.
It is clear that simple insistence on the lack of difference between
adoptive and biologically related families does not eradicate that difference
in the subconscious (or conscious) minds of either adoptees or adoptive
parents. Bohman concluded that the tendency among adoptive parents to be
overprotective of their children, and to deny problems the children may
have in their adjustment to school or their peers is a result of adoptive
parents' insecurity about their parental position.' An adequate adoption
system must address this insecurity.
IV. A PARADIGM SHIFT AND NEW QUESTIONS
The growing protest among members of the adoption triangle, when
combined with research results, constitutes mounting evidence of anomalies
in the traditional adoption system, of instances where the system has failed
to serve the needs of those whom it purports to benefit. Adoptees
repeatedly assert that they have deep needs which are unaddressed by
"Francine always felt she must be adopted .. ").
62. This contention is perhaps the mainstay of the adoptees' movement and is now widely accepted
as true. See, e.g., id. at 110, 113.
63. M. BOHMAN, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 208 (1970).
64. Id. at 206, 208.
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traditional adoption schemes. Emerging awareness of the experiences of
birth mothers challenges virtually every assumption of the traditional
paradigm about birth mothers' experiences and wishes. Research also backs
up claims that traditional systems and attitudes breed uncertainty and
insecurity among adoptive parents. The limits of the traditional paradigm
of adoption are becoming increasingly evident as members of the adoption
triangle become more vocal and researchers continue to study the effects
of adoption. The legal system, established and justified within the old
paradigm, is now being revealed not only as unhelpful, but also as actively
damaging in many ways to adoption participants. We need a completely
new way of looking at the realities of adoption.
Fortunately, we are not without guidance as to the content of a new
paradigm. In fact, many adoption advocacy groups have been working for
years to educate judges, legislators, and the public at large about the way
adoption is actually experienced, and how that differs from the traditional
conception. Researchers have studied and warned us about some of the
adverse effects of traditional adoption. Most recently, the voice of birth
mothers, growing in strength and in number, has begun to add to the
discussion a description of their experience of adoption as well as their
visions for its future. All of these voices and, fortunately, recent adoption
laws in some states (and some other countries), reflect a paradigm very
different from the one that has held sway in the United States throughout
this century.
This new paradigm of adoption will recognize adoption as a positive
solution to a difficult situation for the birth mother, the child and the
adoptive parents. The choice to surrender a child for adoption will be seen
as an appropriate option for those birth mothers who are unable, for
whatever reasons, to raise their children. The depth of the birth mother's
relationship with her child will be recognized, as well as her pain and grief
at the surrender of the child. Adoptees will have some idea of the struggle
involved in such a course of action for a birth mother, and will presumably
suffer less from fears that their birth mothers gave them away because they
did not love them enough to keep them. They will know that there must
have been a very good reason for their adoption. The ongoing post-adop-
tion interest and concern of birth mothers for their children will be
acknowledged. The differences between an adoptive and a biological family
will be recognized openly, in a way that both acknowledges the importance
of an adoptee's tie to her biological family and allows adoptive parents to
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feel secure in their position as parents.
In short, the shroud of secrecy will be lifted from the adoption process.
The interests of the members of the adoption triangle will be more properly
understood, and the system will respond to those interests. Adoption will
be seen as a positive, empowering choice for a woman who cannot raise
her own child, and as an accepted means of building a family for adoptive
parents.
A new paradigm, however, does not simply answer all of our questions
about adoption. Rather, by revolutionizing the way we conceptualize a
problem, it allows us to formulate new and different questions (sometimes
very central ones) that would have been nonsensical or impossible under
the old paradigm. Fleshing out the new paradigm requires the posing and
answering of these questions. Some of them are not new; however, under
the new paradigm, it is possible to address them in a meaningful way for
the first time. Legislators, judges, and agency personnel must take on these
issues and must define both the practical implications and the outer limits
of the new paradigm.
Such new questions include the proper role of considerations of
illegitimacy in policy decisions; the practicalities and implications of
acknowledging difference between adoptive and biologically related
families; the debate over the sealing of adoption records; the extent of
appropriate involvement of birth mothers in the selection of and contact
with an adoptive family (before and/or after the adoptee's age of majority);
and the counselling, support groups, and other services (e.g., financial
assistance) that should be mandated for the birth mother and the adoptive
parents before, during, and after the decision for adoption and the adoption
itself. There are surely many other questions which will only arise as the
new adoption develops in the context of our society. I will briefly address
a few of these questions here, by way of suggesting some of the implica-
tions of the new paradigm on our adoption systems.
A. Illegitimacy and the adoption process
As we have seen, the issue of illegitimacy currently dominates the
adoption debate far more than is explained by the stated concerns of
adoptees, adoptive parents or birth mothers. In reassessing the primacy
given to illegitimacy in traditional thinking about adoption, it is essential
to ask ourselves how it has come to dominate adoption policy, what the
effects of its domination are, and whether we wish to reinforce it with legal
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supports in our statutes and case law.
The roots of the stigma of illegitimacy are found in the age-old attempt
to control the sexual and reproductive power of women. Male-dominated
societies have set strict limits within which it is proper for women to be
sexually active and to reproduce, thus allowing men effectively to control
and maintain power over women and children. One such control has been
the social and legal requirement that a child be connected with a man,
through the legal marriage of the child's mother to the man, in order to be
"legitimate." On the determination of legitimacy has hung such direct
economic consequences as the child's right to support and inheritance from
the father. The severity of the social stigma associated with birth outside
of marriage is in rough proportion to the horrified reaction of the gendered
power structure to women reproducing in a way that does not serve its own
purposes.
The focus on a birth mother's shame as the principal factor in her
decision-making about and experience of adoption is more a product of this
patriarchal horror at women's sexual freedom than it is a reflection of the
experience of either birth mothers or adoptees. Discussions about policies
for the adoption triangle must dismantle the dominance given to consider-
ations of illegitimacy, both because its relative importance in birth mothers'
decision-making has never warranted that dominance, and because the very
notion of illegitimacy is rooted in sexism.
An important part of this dismantling must be a change in the
language, the terminology of "illegitimacy" that surrounds adoption.
Changing the language of our statutes and judicial opinions may seem a
small thing, but not if we keep in mind that language affects not only the
way that we express our ideas, but our very ideas and understandings
themselves. Labeling a child "illegitimate" implies that the child's very
existence is somehow both illicit and inconsequential. This language also
denies the reality of the rich relationship between a mother and her child,
and implies that such a relationship cannot constitute a true family.
Changing popular use of a word or expression is of course not
something that can simply be legislated. However, courts, legislatures and
agencies (the principal structural actors in the adoption scheme) can begin
to move toward positive language. Given the symbiotic relationship
between law and societal attitudes, such positive language will eventually
affect the very way that we think about these families.
Some states already forbid the use of the terminology of illegitimacy
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in any adoption records.' The stated reason for this is to maintain
confidentiality (i.e., to avoid tainting the adoptee with illegitimacy's
stigma). While this justification is a product of the same attitudes that we
seek to eradicate, banning the terminology of illegitimacy in adoption may
force us to focus on other factors in the adoption experience that appropri-
ately demand our attention.
The language of illegitimacy in adoption must also be avoided because
it can serve to create a strong moral presumption that the right thing for an
unmarried mother to do is to surrender her child to a married couple who
can thereby "legitimate" the child and give the child's life full meaning and
potential. The pressure put on unmarried women to surrender their babies
is one of the main themes of Concerned United Birthparents, an advocacy
group for women and men who have surrendered children for adoption.'
A model of adoption that magnifies the specter of illegitimacy in the lives
of the child and her mother places undue pressure on a birth mother, who
is already in a very vulnerable position. In addition, by exaggerating a
birth mother's desire to protect her reputation and retain anonymity, such
a model trivializes both the close relationship of the mother with her
newborn child, and the complex nature of the birth mother's difficult moral
decision.
B. The Sealed Records Controversy
The debate over whether to open sealed adoption records to adult
adoptees upon request has become the focal point for most discussions of
adoption policy. The issue provides a perfect example of the positive
implications of a shift in adoption paradigms. It represents an ideal
opportunity for lawmakers, judges and agencies to begin to listen and
respond to the emerging voices of adoptees and birth mothers.
States that have addressed the records question commonly require or
encourage the collection and release of extensive non-identifying informa-
tion about the birth parents.67 This information can cover such areas as
cultural heritage, religion, education, and a detailed medical history of the
birth parents. It can be gathered at the time of the adoption, and many
65. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1522 (Smith-Hurd 1936).
66. See, e.g., Anderson, Campbell & Cohen, Adoption Abuse, WOMENWISE, Fall 1982, at 6.
67. Howe, supra note 2, at 191. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-68e (1985), which provides
a detailed list of non-identifying information about the birth parents to be recorded.
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states permit the birth parents to update or augment it at any time." Thus
the adoptee has access to important information, without infringing upon
the privacy of the birth mother. Access to this information often satisfies
an adoptee's need to know about her biological roots.'
An understanding of the birth mother's experience in the adoption
process makes it clear that she may also want information about her child
as time passes. A similar file of non-identifying information about the
adoptee should be made available to her. Like the birth mother's file, the
adoptee's file should be updated and augmented at the discretion of the
adoptee and/or the adoptive parents, depending on the adoptee's age.
Some adoption agencies have begun to keep such files for birth
mothers and adoptees. Such record-keeping should be mandated by statute.
The information gathered prior to and as part of the filing of adoption
proceedings is crucial, and provides an opportunity for the state to
standardize the kind and amount of information to be gathered from birth
parents. Many states now require that rather extensive medical histories be
filled out for each of the birth parents.' ° They should have comparable
forms eliciting other information that is also of interest to many adoptees
(physical appearance, interests, religion, family situation, and reasons for
the adoption).7" The agency may also wish to send the birth parents and
the adoptive parents a form or a request for updated information every five
years or so.
Of course there is no guarantee that the forms will be carefully filled
out. Of necessity there must be a "Not known" response available for
many of the questions, and the thoroughness of the information will depend
largely on the importance attributed to it by the agency representative who
explains and presents the forms to the birth parent and the adoptive
68. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-68e (1985).
69. 0 Donnell, supra note 7, at 143-44 (citing TRISEL1OTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS: THE
EXPERIENCE OF ADOPTED PEOPLE (1973)).
70. Connecticut's form CYS-338 is an example of such a medical history form. It is four pages
long and asks detailed questions for any family history of 34 specific medical conditions, from a club
foot to allergies to alcoholism or drug abuse. It also has several more general questions to elicit
information on any conditions that are not specifically mentioned on the form. In addition, one section
addresses the birth mother's menstrual and pregnancy history, and a more detailed section asks for
information about the pregnancy and birth of the child being surrendered for adoption. For older
children, there are questions about the child's medical history, including immunizations and the age
at which she started walking.
71. Connecticut has a brief form, CYS-337, for such information. It is much less thorough than
CYS-338, the medical history, see supra note 70, and should be expanded to encourage the exchange
of extensive social and personal information.
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parents. Nonetheless, the existence of such forms and the comprehensive-
ness of their questions will encourage the exchange of vital information.
Recognizing how important the biological tie is to adoptees and birth
mothers, and how helpful information can be, the provision of extensive
non-identifying information is a logical, non-threatening step toward
providing for the needs of these two groups. There is little justification for
withholding or failing to collect this information.
Many adoptees, however, want access to information that will identify
their birth parents. Traditionally such information was unavailable to
adoptees, except upon a showing of good cause why it should be made
available. Some states, however, have begun to reconsider this policy.
Idaho, Alabama and Kansas have made the information available upon the
simple request of the adult adoptee, with no consent of the birth parent
required.72 A New Jersey case, Mills v. Atlantic City Department of Vital
Statistics,' suggests that the burden to show good cause should shift from
the adoptee to the state when the adoptee attains majority, the state thus
being required to show good cause why an adoptee should not be granted
access to her files. This would apply both prospectively and retrospective-
ly.
Viewed within a new paradigm of adoption, such solutions are clearly
appropriate where the birth parents know at the time of the adoption that
the information will be available to the adult adoptee upon request, and
where they have an opportunity to affirmatively request that the informa-
tion not be released. Adoption advocacy groups have long been pressing
for this kind of information exchange, and research indicates that openness
about adoption will create an atmosphere that will benefit those involved,
whether or not adoptees return to search for their birth parents.74
Moreover, I believe there would be little decrease in the number of babies
relinquished for adoption because of the availability of this information.
The states that have such policies have seen no greater decrease in the
number of adoptions than have other states.75
There are difficulties, however, in opening records where the birth
72. Comment, Severed Roots, supra note 13, at 104 n.10.
73. 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646, 654 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
74. See, e.g., 0 Donnell, supra note 7, at 144 (citing evidence that adoptee's search for birth
parents often improves her relationship with adoptive parents); Bohman, supra note 63, at 206, 209
(openness about special circumstances of adoptive families can lead to greater ease within relationships
and fewer problems due to maladjustment).
75. Note, Violation or Need for Reform?, supra note 13, at 580.
19901
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
mother at the time of the adoption decision expected the records to be
sealed. Simply opening the records years later does nothing to protect the
interest of those birth mothers who expect and genuinely wish to avoid
further contact with their children. In such cases, the resulting reunions can
prove disastrous for both the birth mother and the adoptee.76 Clearly,
some provision must be made for those birth mothers who wish to be left
alone.
Some state legislatures have followed the lead of many adoptee
advocacy groups and have established mutual consent registries, where
adoptees and birth parents can register their consent to the release of
identifying information about themselves to the other party. This process
does not recognize an unconditional right of the adoptee to identifying
information, but seeks a balance between what may be conflicting desires
of the adoptee and the birth mother. It facilitates contact between two
willing parties, and at the same time does not invade the privacy of those
parties who are opposed to a reunion. In this sense the mutual consent
registry mayl be the most satisfactory compromise in the debate over an
adoptee's right of access to information surrounding her birth.
The major flaw of such a scheme, of course, is that it cannot function
unless it is convenient and financially accessible, and unless birth parents
and adoptees alike know of its existence. Massive initial publicity
campaigns are required to make it effective in the case of adoptions that
have already occurred. Once a mutual consent registry is implemented,
birth parents and adoptive parents can be notified of it at the time of the
adoption proceedings.
Legislatures should establish state-sponsored mutual consent registries
to give out identifying information. For adoptions that occurred prior to the
establishment of the registry, the presumption should be that the birth
parents do not wish to be contacted unless they file their consent with the
registry. Prospectively from the establishment of the registry, however, the
presumption should be reversed. At the time of the adoption, agency
officials should explain to the birth mother, and the birth father if he
participates, that if they wish to have their identifying information
withheld, they must file a statement to that effect with the registry. This
presumption in favor of releasing information would be a response to the
understanding that in general, unless a participant requests otherwise, the
76. See supra note 35.
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members of the adoption triangle are better served by the open exchange
of information than by its withholding.
When a request for identifying information is made by either party, the
agency should immediately notify the non-requesting party of the request
and ensure that that party's earlier consent is still valid. If the agency is
unable to locate the non-requesting party, the consent should be presumed
to continue.'
Finally, a significant campaign must be mounted to educate the public
about the existence of the registry. If its existence is not common public
knowledge, the program will have little effect on adoptions that occurred
prior to its establishment. Extensive publicity must be an integral part of
the foundation of a mutual consent registry.
The registry, if properly publicized and accessible, should eventually
become the predominant vehicle for information sharing between adoptees
and birth parents. Because the presumption is that access to identifying
information should be granted, this information will only be withheld in
those cases where the birth parents specifically request it. In those cases the
good cause standard (requiring a showing of medical or other necessity)
will be appropriate in determining whether the adoptee's need for the
information is important enough to override the birth parents' expressed
interest in retaining anonymity.
In the meantime, given the lack of awareness about registries and the
prevailing negative attitude in agencies and courts toward granting adoptees
access to identifying information, the good cause standard is too restrictive
to serve the interests of participants in adoptions. Agencies and courts have
frustrated access to adoption information for so long that many members
of adoption triangles now believe that they have no way of obtaining such
information or of allowing it to be released. Something more than the mere
establishment of a registry is now required to facilitate the passage of
information between willing parties.
Connecticut's response has been a comprehensive law detailing a
procedure in which adoption agencies, when asked for identifying
information, are required to spend at least six hours searching for the birth
77. It is possible that in some cases one birth parent may consent to the release and the other may
refuse. In such cases it seems that the agency should inform both the adoptee and the consenting birth
parent of the other's refusal and should release information only about the consenting birth parent.
Although this procedure provides no absolute guarantees for the refusing birth parent (because the
consenting birth parent could give the adoptee the information), it seems that the warning to both the
adoptee and the consenting birth parent would counterbalance the danger that identifying information
about the non-consenting birth parent would be revealed to the adoptee.
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parents in order to obtain their written consent to divulge the informa-
tion.7 s Contact with the birth parent is initially made by an employee of
the agency, which gives the birth parent an opportunity to refuse the
release of the information if she wishes. It can be argued that this contact
is in itself an invasion of the birth parent's life, but agency workers
involved in the reunion process see the Connecticut statute, in place since
1977, as an effective solution to a difficult problem.'
C. Conceptions of Family
As we have seen, the current statutory model of adoption is misguided
in its attempt to portray the adoptive relationship as the identical equivalent
of the biological family. In fact the experience of being raised in an
adoptive family is different from that of being raised in a biological family,
despite any attempts that may be made to deny or hide that difference. The
manner in which parents are able to handle this difference has tremendous
implications for the dynamic of the adoptive family and, ultimately, for the
well-being of the adoptee as a child and as an adult.' A new paradigm
of adoption allows us to examine the dissimilarity honestly and see what
implications for policy flow from it.
Adoptive and biological families differ in that in the former there is no
biological tie between parents and child(ren). As we have seen, a biological
tie provides a connection for an adoptee to a past, to a personal and family
history, to a context for her physical characteristics, and to an ethnic
culture. Lacking the opportunity to recognize aspects of herself in her
genetic family and culture, an adoptee often suffers from difficulty in
forming a secure sense of identity. The adoptive parents, for their part,
often feel a certain insecurity in their role as parents, because they lack this
biological link with their children.
At the same time, adoptive parents are very much "real" parents to
their children. They are the ones who stay up nights with their children
when they are sick, who share the triumphs and the tragedies and the
78. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-68i to -681 (1985).
79. Interview with Marie Varrone, A.C.S.W., Coordinator of Adoption Services at Catholic
Charities/Catholic Family Services, New Haven, CT (Mar. 25, 1988).
80. See M. BOHMAN, supra note 63, at 202, 206. Bohman finds it a "reasonable assumption" that
much of the maladjustment he found among the adopted children could be explained by the difficulty
experienced by the adoptive parents in accepting the adoptive relationship.
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thousands of uneventful days. It is they who shape their children's world
with their love, their discipline, and their way of life. Adoptees know this.
They recognize the fact that they have dual families, both of which are
important in different ways. Even those adult adoptees who search for their
birth families know that their desire to know their biological roots does not
in any way challenge the integrity of their adoptive families or imply that
their adoptive parents are not their "real" parents. In fact, an adoptee's
search for her birth parents often improves her relationship with her
adoptive parents"' by replacing the vague, mythical presence of "other"
parents with the reality of the flesh-and-blood birth parents. This serves to
clarify the role of the adoptive parents and to emphasize the tremendous
importance they have had in the adoptee's life.
In the same way, societal and structural acknowledgement of the fact
that adoptive families differ from biologically related families will not
undermine the position of adoptive parents. It will ground their position,
not in a fiction based on a birth certificate, but in the reality of their
relationship as primary care providers and psychological parents' to their
children. Emphasizing the true basis of the parental relationship will
actually ease the anxiety of many adoptive parents, who can be confident
in their role as parents without trying to live up to biologically related
parents. 3 A deeper sense of security in the adoptive family is surely in
the best interests of the child, as well as of the parents.
The new paradigm of adoption must recognize and value both of the
adoptee's families, and must balance the importance of the respective roles
of biology and of nurturing in her life.84 The structures of adoption must
find a more adequate way to accommodate the complementarity of adoptive
81. 0 Donnell, supra note 7, at 144-45.
82. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNITZ, in BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
17-20 (1979), use the term "psychological parent" to refer to that person or those people with whom
the child has formed a parent-child relationship. This person is truly a parent to the child, and a
biological connection is irrelevant to becoming a psychological parent.
83. A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, supra note 52, at 77.
84. The social construction of parenthood is a question that also has profound implications in the
face of reproductive technologies such as artificial insemination and "surrogacy." The struggle to make
analogies between these new forms of parenthood and traditional ones has served mainly to emphasize
the differences and to stir up confusion in arguments about the rights of the parties in countless
situations. As a society, we clearly need a new paradigm of parenthood that balances biological and
social relationships in a variety of reproductive configurations. In the process of balancing, it is
essential to remember that by the time a baby is born, her mother has already established not only a
biological, but also an intense physical and emotional relationship with her. The "surrogacy" industry
is able to operate only by denying the reality, the intensity, and the value of that relationship. It is only
thus that brokers are able to call the baby's biological and birth mother a "surrogate."
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and birth families. As discussed in the previous section, the state can move
toward this goal by being sensitive and open to adult adoptees' requests for
information about their birth families.
Another step could be a move away from the reissuance of birth
certificates that list the adoptive parents as the adoptee's only parents.
While the adoptee must have some form of identification while she is a
minor, given the history of the legal system's attitudes towards birth
families, the reissuance of birth certificates reeks of an attempt to deny the
existence of the birth parents. Perhaps instead the state could issue a
certificate of adoption which would serve the purposes of a birth certifi-
cate, but would reflect the reality of the adoption instead of a fiction about
the adoptee's birth.
There are, in addition to a different basis for parent-child relationships,
also important differences in the processes that bring parenthood to
adoptive and biological parents. Adoptive parents have most often
experienced a protracted process of discovering and confirming their
inability to conceive a child. The process is usually long and very painful
for the couple, who often find it extremely difficult to come to grips
emotionally with their infertility. Bohman found that years after the
adoption, many adoptive parents were not yet reconciled to their biological
childlessness and were still "highly concerned" with the issue of infertili-
ty. 5 In addition, adoptive parents do not have the predictable nine months
of pregnancy to prepare physically and psychologically for the arrival of
their baby, and often miss out on the first few weeks of contact with her.
The story of her arrival into their family is very different from that of a
simple birth into a family. The unusualness of adoptive parenthood leaves
adoptive parents with what Bohman calls a "role handicap," with which
they must learn to cope.'
In addition to dealing with their own attitudes, adoptive families also
must cope with societal attitudes towards adoption, infertility and
illegitimacy. This is a burden that is not shared by families whose children
are born to them. The adjustment of the family can be either greatly aided
or greatly hindered by the reactions of family, friends, and neighbors.
The characteristics that make the adoptive family unique are the same
factors that place added stress on the family. Part of a response to the
85. M. BOHMAN, supra note 63, at 207.
86. Id. at 28.
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uniqueness of the adoptive situation must be the establishment and mainte-
nance of a comprehensive network of training and support for the families
before and after the adoption. Pre-adoption training should include
thorough discussion of issues of infertility and of the experience, of
becoming adoptive parents. It should provide a forum for exploration of
the implications of the lack of a biological relationship between parents and
children, of the experiences of birth mothers and fathers, of the need for
frankness about adoption, of many adoptive parents' fear that someone will
come and take their child from them, as well as practical advice in
adjusting to life with a new baby. The training should address all the gaps
left by our society's lack of role models for adoptive parents, and should
be run by teams of (or at least include the active participation of)
experienced adoptive parents, birth parents, and adult adoptees. It could be
funded and run through a combination of state and agency money and
efforts.
Support groups for adoptive parents are also needed once the adoption
is final and they are no longer in active contact with the adoption agency.
Parents can begin to shape their roles and their identity as adoptive parents
by drawing on the shared wisdom and support of other people who have
been through or who are going through the difficult and the joyous times
of life in an adoptive family. Some agency adoption workers believe that
the promotion of these support groups is one of the greatest needs of
adoptive families. States should not only urge adoptive families to
participate in such groups, but should organize and fund them wherever
possible. At the very least they should provide a list of all adoption support
groups in the family's area, as well as any other support services available
to the family.
D. Protections and Services for Birth Mothers
The new adoption paradigm highlights specific and important needs of
birth mothers that must be addressed by adoption laws and agency policies.
The clearest need is for extensive counseling and support services before,
during and after the adoption. Statutes should mandate that these services
be provided at the expense of the adoption agency or the state department
of child services, and that they be provided in both private and agency
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adoptions.' In initial counseling, the pregnant woman or the mother of
a child already born must be encouraged to explore her motivations in
considering adoption and the other options that are available to her. If the
agency worker providing the counseling has doubts about the expectant
mother's ability to comprehend or cope emotionally with the ramifications
of relinquishing her child, she should be willing to refer her to a
professional counselor at agency or state expense.
If financial worries or the lack of a place to live are the primary
motivations for adoption, then all attempts should be made to provide
assistance in finding a job, or a place to live, or whatever will meet the
mother's specific need. Good pre-adoption counseling will weed out many
of the women who first seek information about adoption. The coordinator
of adoptive services at one agency estimated that about one-third of the
birth mothers that come to them actually go through with adoption
plans."8 Good counseling will help to insure that the birth mothers who
do choose adoption will do so as freely as possible, and only when it
clearly appears to be the best course of action.
Another safeguard against coercion for the birth mother is a required
waiting period before a mother can surrender her rights to a newborn.
Most states require a minimum of two or three days after the birth of a
child before the mother may sign relinquishment papers."9 Some agencies,
however, believe that even a few days is not enough time for birth mothers
to be ready to make such a final decision, and they therefore routinely give
them two to three weeks, and will give them up to three months if
necessary.' In addition, a birth parent usually has a legal right to revoke
her decision within thirty days after the papers are signed.9" These time
requirements, which are vital to the protection of birth mothers, neverthe-
less directly conflict with the desire of all the parties that the baby be
87. Private adoptions raise a series of important questions in the new paradigm that I cannot
adequately address here. Suffice it to say that I believe that the protection of birth mothers from
coercion and exploitation, and of children from grossly inappropriate homes, demands that established
adoption agencies and the state supervise certain aspects of private adoptions, and that services such
as counseling be provided. Connecticut's Identified Adoption Act outlines one such scheme of basic
state regulation of private adoptions.
88. Interview with Marie Varrone, supra note 79.
89. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-61c(d) (1985) (prohibits a mother's signing termination
papers within 48 hours of the birth of her child).
90. Interview with Marie Varrone, supra note 79.
91. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 112.3(4) (Consol. 1979 & Supp. 1989) (relinquishing
parent has thirty days to revoke decision).
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placed with the adoptive family as quickly as possible to allow early and
secure bonding between parents and child. Agencies must work to balance
these opposing considerations without compromising the protections due
the birth mother. Many do this by seeking adoptive parents who will accept
the risk involved in taking a baby during the first month, when the birth
mother's relinquishment is not yet legally final.'
It is also important for birth mothers to be able to participate in the
choice of adoptive parents and in the child's transition to the new family.
Although agencies retain the ultimate decision-making authority, many ask
for the guidance of birth mothers in choosing adoptive families. Birth
mothers can specify their preference for a particular ethnic or religious
background, a two-parent home, a couple that has been married a long
time, a family with other children, or any other family characteristics that
may be important to them. They are then shown a profile of the prospec-
tive adoptive family, and can approve or disapprove the match." This
participation is particularly important because most birth mothers choose
adoption believing that the adoptive family will be able to provide the child
with those things that they wish they could provide, but cannot.
Many agencies also now encourage birth mothers to send a gift and/or
a letter with the child to her adoptive home. Some also encourage the
adoptive parents to write to the birth mother. This exchange helps to bring
understanding and to provide closure for both adoptive parents and birth
mothers to the child's transition.' It also provides a connection with the
past for the adoptee as she grows. For the same reason, birth parents and
adoptive parents should have a place (e.g., a file at the adoption agency)
to send later letters or photographs should they wish to share more
information. For a returning adult adoptee, such a file can provide a
chronicle of the birth parent's feelings and desires for her.
There are countless ways that traditional adoption schemes have failed
to answer the needs of birth mothers. A new adoption paradigm that
includes their concerns opens the door to a host of ways that these needs
can be met without jeopardizing the integrity of the adoption system.
V. CONCLUSION
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The currently prevailing paradigm of adoption in the United States,
reflected both in adoption laws and in social attitudes and role expectations,
fails to account adequately for the actual experiences and concerns of any
of the members of the adoption triangle. This failure engenders confusion
and frustration in adoption participants when their experiences do not
mirror the expectations of the paradigm, and misunderstanding and low
self-esteem when they accept the representations of the paradigm as to the
other participants' feelings about them. The images perpetuated by the
traditional adoption paradigm are in fact actively harmful to the self-images
of adoptees, birth parents, and adoptive parents.
The legal system is inextricably entwined in the paradigm and the
system of adoption that has been the source of great personal pain for
many adoption participants. The moment has arrived for legislatures and
judges to acknowledge the paradigm shift that adoption advocates have
been both seeking and heralding for some years now, and to change the
way that the law frames and analyzes questions of adoption. The new
paradigm brings into focus the human experience of adoptees, birth parents
and adoptive parents, and seeks to create a system that responds to that
experience. Far from providing specific answers to policy questions, this
new focus simply and profoundly questions the basis of all previous
policies: do they accurately reflect the experiences of members of the
adoption triangle, and do they promote among these members a healthy
image of themselves as people and as participants in the adoption process?
The specific questions that arise are many and complex. In addition to
the issues discussed here, the new paradigm requires a reevaluation of the
role of birth fathers in the adoption of newborns and any obligation a court
or agency may have to involve them in the adoption process;95 the
acceptability of private (non-agency) adoptions and the state's role, if any,
in their regulation; and the process and the criteria used in the selection of
adoptive parents. These questions must be addressed from the vantage
point of a new adoption paradigm, with all the energy and the good will
of those who work for the good of families formed by adoption. Only then
95. The Supreme Court has given considerable attention to the interests of fathers in adoption
proceedings that involve older children, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1971), but has not specifically addressed procedural requirements or rights in
the context of the adoption of newborn infants. Such an analysis will have to be extremely nuanced and
must take into account the disproportionate responsibility placed on women for childrearing in our
society, and the tremendous socialization that goes along with it.
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will adoption emerge as it should: as a positive, humane option for women
who cannot raise the children to whom they give birth, and for adoptive
parents who cannot give birth to the children they long to raise.

